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Abstract - In Wireless Sensor Networks, Broadcast communication is the most fundamental and prevailing communication
pattern. Securing the broadcast messages from the adversary is critical issue. To defend the WSNs against the adversary
attacks of impersonation of a broadcast source or receiver, modification/fabrication of the broadcast message, attacker
injecting malicious traffic to deplete the energy from the sensors, broadcast authentication of source and receivers becomes
extremely inevitable. In this paper, we propose a novel ECC based public key distribution protocol and broadcast
authentication scheme. The proposed method provides high security and has low overhead.
Keywords: pkc , key management, broadcast authentication.

1.

message with the public key of the sender. Verifying
and guaranteeing the public key and its distribution
belong to the sender becomes a challenging issue in
WSN that uses broadcast communication. Usually, it
is solved by the Certificate authority (CA) a trusted
third party certifying that a public key belongs to a
sender. Hence we propose a novel public key
distribution protocol to distribute the public keys
securely in which the public keys are usable only by
the non-malicious nodes(regular nodes) and a scheme
to achieve broadcast communication using the public
keys received through the public key distribution
protocol.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the related work in WSN. Section 3
discusses the system description followed by
proposed method in section 4. Section 5 concludes
this paper.

INTRODUCTION

A Wireless Sensor Networks consists of a large
number of resource constrained sensor nodes[2] that
are spatially distributed in an hostile environment and
the with resource rich node called as the Base
Station(BS). The sensor nodes task is to sense
physical
phenomena
from
its
immediate
surroundings, process and transmit the sensed data to
the other nodes or Base stations. WSNs are used in
applications that are sensitive to environmental
parameters that require monitoring, tracking and
controlling. In the course of WSN’s computing and
communication aspect broadcast transmission is one
of the most dominant communication and there are
two types a: network broadcast b: local broadcast.
Usually, broadcast communication in WSN is used to
collect data from sensors and update the routing
information. Since the nodes after the deployment
cannot be manually maintained and monitored,
security becomes critical.
In such a scenario maintaining and monitoring of
sensor node and their network of communication
becomes a major issue and information security will
be a critical challenge in WSN because attacks from
adversaries(with powerful resources)[4] can be active
or passive and internal or external and attacks against
basic WSN operation or against security mechanisms.
Similarly, the attacks of impersonation of a broadcast
source or receiver, modification/fabrication of the
broadcast message [1] and
attacker injecting
malicious traffic to deplete the energy from the
sensors will be a major problem. Broadcast
authentication of source and receivers becomes
important factor and we have proposed to consider
this aspect in our work.
Authentication [2] is a procedure in which the
sending entity signs the message using the private key
and the receiving entity verifies the authenticity of the

2.

RELATED WORK

The existing authentication schemes are given below
Certificate –Based Authentication Scheme: In [6]
Each user and the Sink of WSN is pre-deployed with
Public/private key pair. The sink serves as a CA. The
sink issues each user a Public key certificate and
broadcasts the message using this certificate. The
receiver sensor nodes verify the authenticity of the
received message. But the scheme is inefficient to
support user revocation and takes two signature
operations for verification which is energy
consuming.
Merkel Hash Tree Based Scheme: In the basic Merkel
tree based authentication scheme[6], the sink collects
all the public keys on the current network users and
constructs a Merkel hash tree. Each node obtains its
AAI according to the corresponding leaf nodes
location in the Merkel Hash Tree. The user
revocation problem is reduced to a great extent and
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storage is efficient but communication is inefficient.
ID based Scheme[6]: adopts an automatic public key
update technique , it eliminates the existence of the
certificates or the AAI and requires much smaller
space storage space to support user revocation.
Perrig et al. [7] proposed µTESLA, a well known
broadcast authentication scheme for the WSNs. It is
based on symmetric key cryptographic techniques,
and hence is secure. However as proved by [29] the
symmetric key based algorithms are not as secure
against the node compromise. Many variants of
µTESLA are proposed for WSNs (e.g., [8] [9] [10]
[11]) to improve its performance. The variants as well
as µTESLA, however, are subject to the following
defects. First, maintenance of time synchronization in
WSNs is a complicated task. Second, distribution of
the initial parameters introduces heavy overhead
since it is implemented by the unicast transmission.
Third, delayed authentication is inevitable.
Ren et al. [12] and Du et al. [13] propose to
authenticate broadcast messages of WSNs with PKC
since overhead of PKC for WSNs has significantly
been reduced by using Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC). Nevertheless, the PKC based broadcast
authentication schemes so far are not affordable by
current generation of sensor nodes because of the
intensive use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA). Gennaro et al. [14] propose
signature amortization to sign efficiently digital
streams. A number of improvements are developed
soon (e.g., [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]).
The existing clustering schemes are listed below
LEACH [25] ) is the first clustering algorithm that
was proposed for reducing power consumption in
WSNs. In LEACH, the clustering task is rotated
among the nodes, based on duration. Direct
communication is used by each cluster head (CH) to
forward the data to the base station (BS).But LEACH
is not applicable to networks deployed in large
regions., PEGASIS [26] The main idea in PEGASIS
is for each node to receive from and transmit to close
neighbors and take turns being the leader for
transmission to the BS. This approach will distribute
the energy load evenly among the sensor nodes in the
network. Initially the nodes are placed randomly in
the play field, and therefore, the i –th node is at a
random location. The nodes will be organized to
form a chain, which can either be accomplished by
the sensor nodes themselves using a greedy algorithm
starting from some node. Alternatively, the BS can
compute this chain and broadcast it to all the sensor
nodes., TEEN [27] TEEN is suitable for time-critical
sensing applications. Moreover this protocol is quite
efficient in terms of energy consumption and
response time. The main disadvantage of this scheme
is that when periodic reports are needed and if the
threshold is not received, the user will not get any
data from the network at all. This scheme
inappropriate for periodic monitoring of events. and
APTEEN [28] APTEEN is an improvement to TEEN

to overcome its limitation and aims at both capturing
periodic data collections as LEACH and reacting to
time-critical events as TEEN. All the Cluster Heads
form a network and above them lies the Base Stationwith highest power and no resource restriction.
3.

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

3.1 SYSTEM MODEL
WSN comprises of spatially distributed sensor nodes
in hostile unattended environment. All the sensor
nodes of the WSN communicate with the Base
Station. Base station’s function is to aggregate the
data and process it. For simplicity, we consider a
WSN with clusters. The organization of the network
is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Organization Of Nodes In Wsn

Clustering is grouping of nodes into a feasible size
and then assigning each cluster a cluster head. The
cluster head is a node with highest energy in the
cluster that is capable of performing the data
aggregation and processing, usually pre-assigned or
elected. The main objective of clustering is to extend
the lifetime of the WSN by reducing the energy
consumption. Also, clustering makes WSN easily
scalable, by attaching a new cluster with a cluster
head.
3.2 SECURITY MODEL
To achieve secure communication and provide
authentication, keys are critical. In WSN Key
distribution is based on 2 methods 1:Symmetric
method: where the sender and the receiver both use
same secret key and 2:Public Key Method: this
method involves the use of pair of keys at both sender
and receiver. The Public key method is more secure
than that of symmetric key method as there is no need
for key sharing and key management is easy since it’s
more resilient to node capture attacks.
Because the WSN’s were highly resource constrained
and also that public key cryptography(PKC) involved
heavy calculations , it was claimed that PKC is
highly infeasible in the WSN environment until
proved otherwise. Extensive research was carried out
for implementing the PKC algorithms on the WSN
viz the RSA, Diffie Hellman Key Exchange
Algorithm and ECC on various sensor nodes. From
the analysis it was proved that ECC is better than
RSA as the key size of RSA-1024 bits is too large
compared to ECC of 160 bits.
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The ECC implementation for WSNs, public keys
generation takes 34 seconds (sec), and shared secrets
can be distributed within the same time by using just
over 1 KB of SRAM and 34 KB of ROM.
ECC algorithm is based on the following rules:
When two points on the elliptic curve are added, we
obtain the third point that also lies on the elliptic
curve.
In an elliptic curve the multiplication of a point on the
curve with an integer i.e., k*P can also be obtained by
addition and thus be defined as the sum of k copies of
P. For eg: 2*P=P+P and 3*P=P+P+P and so on.
The ECC algorithm works as follows in all the sensor
nodes:
A: Key Generation
Let F be a non-secret fixed curve point.
1: A node selects a secret random number PR that is
the secret key of the node.
2: The Public key PU of a node is calculated as
PU=PR*F. PU is publicized by the node.
B: Message Transmission
Say node A(has key pair PUa and PRa) wishes to
send a message M to node B(has key pair PUb and
PRb )
1: The node A computes PRa*Pub and uses the result
as secret key.
2: The node B can retrieve the secret key by
calculating PRb*PUa
since,
PRb*PUa=PRb*(PRa*F)=(PRb*PRa)*F=PRa*(PRb*
F)=PRa*PUb.

Base staion
Public key of base station

PRbs

Private key of base station

CH

Cluster head

PUch

Public key of cluster head

PRch

Private key of cluster head

S

Sensor node

PUs

Public key of sensor node

PRs

Private key of sensor node

IDs

Identity of sensor node

Nonce

Random value

KS

Session key

H

Hash function

E

Encryption

D

Decryption

CertREQ

Request for certificate

||

Concatenation

Cs

certificate

TABLE 1: NOTATION USED IN PROPOSED PROTOCOL

4.

PROPOSED METHOD

In this section we discuss the proposed method. The
proposed method has two functions 1: the public key
distribution protocol 2: broadcast authentication
scheme
4.1. THE PUBLIC KEY DISTRIBUTION
PROTOCOL
In the bootstrapping stage , all the nodes register
themselves to the CH, the details of all the registered
nodes is stored in the SensorNodeTable by the CH.

3.3. NOTATIONS IN PROPOSED MECHANISM
For the sake of convenience, the following notations
are used.Base Station(BS):It has two keys-public
key(PUbs) and the private key(PKbs) generated using
the ECC algorithm (as explained above) and predeployed. A copy of the public key of base station is
pre-deployed in the cluster heads. Cluster Head(CH):
also have a pair of public key (PUch) and the private
key (PRch). The public key of the Cluster heads is
pre-deployed in all the sensor nodes. Also acts as
Certificate authority that cannot be compromised by
the adversaries. The CH has a table called as the
SensorNodeTable which stores the details of all the
nodes that have registered itself to the cluster during
the bootstrapping phase. Sensor nodes: has the public
key and the private keys(PUs/PRs) and identity
IDs.Nonce: is a unique random number, generated by
the node.Hash function(H): A cryptographic hash
function is an algorithm that takes an arbitrary block
of data and returns a fixed-size bit string, the
(cryptographic) hash value. The data to be encoded is
called the "message," and the hash value is called the
message digest or simply digest. Certificate identity :
IDs. The notations are summarized in the table 1
SYMBOL

BS
PUbs

Protocol Scenario:
The main aim of the protocol is to securely distribute
the public key to all the nodes in the cluster. This is
achieved by 3 step procedure:
1: The sensor node requests for a Certificate from
the Sensor node for validating itself to the Cluster.
2:The cluster head creates a Certificate for the
requested sensor node and broadcasts it to all the
sensor nodes in the cluster.
3: The sensor nodes of that cluster, who receive the
certificate from the Cluster Head, update their
table with the public key of the new sensor node.

Figure 2: Protocol Scenario Within A Cluster

DEFINITION
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A brief discussion of the 3 step procedure is given in
the following section and summarized in Table 2
Step 1: Sender selects a nonce – unique random
number and finds the Hash H of the nonce which is
stored in the sender as the secret session key KS,
KS(IDs)=H(nonce)
and sends a Certificate request to the CH. The
certificate request contains the IDs, the PUs and
nonce which are encrypted using the PUch.
CertREQ= EPUch(IDs||PUs||nonce)
Step 2: The CH receives the CertREQ, decrypts
using the PRch, updates the SensorNodeTable at the
CH with the node details
IDs||PUs||nonce =DPRch(CertREQ)
and then calculates the HASH H of the Nonce ,which
also updates/stores in the SensorNodeTable
KS(IDs)=H(nonce)
that is encypted with the CH private key and
broadcasts to the other receiver nodes in the cluster
EPRch(KS(IDs))
The CH replies back with the encrypted Certificate
Cs which contains the IDs, the PUs and nonce which
are encrypted using the PUch.
Cs=IDc||IDs||EPRch(IDc||IDs||PUs||nonce)
EKS(IDs)(Cs))
Step 3: The sender S receives the encrypted certificate
from the CH, which it can decrypt using the secret
key calculated by hashing the nonce and broadcast
the same to the other nodes. The other nodes have
already received the secret key from the CH only
valid receivers who have the public key of the CH
can decrypt and utilize the certificate obtained from
the sender. At the receiver to obtain the public key of
the sender
KS(IDs)=DPUch(EPRch(KS(IDs)))
Cs=D KS(IDs)( EKS(IDs)(Cs))
The public key distribution protocol is efficient for
the WSNs. The certificate remains valid unless
explicitly revoked by the CH or the Base station , the
PRs can be used to encrypt the broadcast message as
long as the certificate is revoked. The receivers never
contact the CA throughout the protocol.
The public key distribution protocol is quiet secure
way to exchange the PUs with the receivers, as all the
time the message is kept confidential by encrypting it.
The messages can be utilized, only by the nodes that
are registered and have the CHs public key. Hence
this strongly secures the protocol.

verification contains two steps: the sender verification
by decrypting the message with the KS(IDs) obtained
during the public key distribution and the message
signature verification as in ECDSA[10].

TABLE 2:
PROTOCOL

5.

SUMMARY

OF

KEY

DISTRIBUTION

CONCLUSION

Many WSN applications require communication
between the sensor nodes to be secure and free from
attacks by malicious nodes. This is achieved from the
proposed protocol that secures communication by
distributing the public key securely. The public key
that is broadcast, can be retrieved only by the regular
nodes, where as malicious nodes cannot. The
proposed scheme has low overhead and retains high
security by avoiding all the malicious nodes from
being able to interpret the messages received from the
sender nor the CH. This Scheme does not require any
time synchronization and also achieves immediate
authentication.
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